For at least as long as I can remember, pundits in the West have been predicting the imminent collapse of the Chinese miracle. If the speed of reform is not sufficient, then the unintended impacts of the one child policy will surely do the job. If it is not the numerous non-performing loans in the banking sector that are sowing the seeds of destruction, then it is bound to be President Xi's militaristic aspirations.
Depending on which expert you listen to, the list of possible hurdles - not necessarily invalid in terms of their individual gravity - goes on and on. And it is certainly true that China faces enormous threats to its future stability on a variety of fronts. But such factors are invariably distorted by the erroneous fictions we apply in a desperate effort to provide lucid reasons for why such collapse is inevitable. Myths like Chinese workers are good at counterfeit manufacturing but unskilled at innovation. Or, (I love this one) productivity in Chinese industry can never match Western efficiencies. Rapid and disruptive change of the kind China has undertaken is unsustainable – sooner or later the entire experiment must collapse, just as it did in the Soviet Union. Up-and-coming entrepreneurs leave China for the West where there are more opportunities…
To anyone with even a basic inkling of life in contemporary China these statements are deceptively false. Sweeping assertions containing shards of the truth. Loud firecrackers accompany the dance of the red dragon: a dance that has already reshaped markets, competition, trade and politics, pulled millions out of poverty, and defied the primacy of the Occidental worldview. For most of us the dance itself remains an exotic mystery.
Of course each of the aforementioned issues, as well as other widely acknowledged problems - such as escalating labour costs, the private property bubble, an aging population, and the drag of state-owned enterprises on the economy - could all bring adversity to China. But the simple fact is none of these factors have had the kind of seismic impact some of us expected and, let us admit it, secretly hoped for. Nor are any of them likely to bring China to its knees – now or in the immediate future.
My confidence that this is the case, a point that will doubtless be disputed by those who think they know better, or pretend to have a more informed slant on current affairs, is based upon a simple conviction: when the hordes of China-watchers tell us what is happening in China (and why) they rely on official versions of tightly-scripted public utterances, which are themselves open to misinterpretation.
By and large our observations are filtered through an Occidental lens that diffuses the reality. This also applies to some Western correspondents living in China, witnesses who fail to engage unreservedly in the communal socialist experience. Furthermore, upon closer scrutiny, many of the more dire predictions aimed at China are a mixture of ignorance, wishful thinking and a failure to comprehend three important tenets:
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There is absolutely no compelling reason for China to copy the West’s most favoured models and practices in order to grow and prosper. All other things being equal, neither market capitalism nor democratic governance are innately better, or more virtuous, than state-supported capitalism and a unicameral system of government. Both can be degraded, or sustain their integrity. Both can benefit citizens, or destroy the social fabric of the society. Both can be gamed for individual gain.
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Free market capitalism particularly, at least as currently practiced in the West, is never free and far from perfect. As its detrimental impacts and unwanted side-effects become more and more costly in human terms it is hardly surprising that the Chinese leadership should overtly try to avoid the more obvious traps they see playing out in the West as best they can.
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Forging a uniquely hybrid path of state-supported capitalism, underpinned by a mercantilist approach to trade, as best illustrated by the Belt & Road initiative, is strategically shrewd - especially given China’s unique history, culture and Confucian ethos.
So within the context of China’s re-emergence onto the world stage it could be argued that the best chance of continued success will come from China doing what it has done for the past quarter century or more – at least since Deng Xiaoping opened the country to international competition following his visits to Singapore in 1978, and the USA the following year. After all, the record of social progress since then has been remarkable.
But these three tenets may also give us a clue as to an emerging factor that could be of concern. Indeed it could very well signal an inner erosion of confidence that eventually brings down the Chinese empire – or at least causes it to change tack dramatically.
This wild card concerns (i) a palpable rivalry between the princelings - the close-knit web of sons and daughters of revolutionary heroes who have slowly gained political kudos in China, (ii) the enormous affluence of this group in comparison to ordinary Chinese workers, and (iii) the intensifying social coercion, along with instruments of surveillance, being deployed by Xi Jinping in his efforts both to engrave his personal brand into the archives of the Chinese Communist Party, and to control a populace of some 1.4 billion people, dispersed over a landmass covering roughly one-fourteenth of the total land area of Earth.
Ironically this situation reflects a similar trend in the West where the disparity between a small minority of individuals and corporations with extreme wealth, and those who have very little by comparison, is a concern. Plug into those circumstances a penchant for increasingly authoritarian policies from the incumbent elite, and you have a highly volatile situation where a social revolution, an economic meltdown, or both, becomes feasible. This possibility was most evident recently with intensifying divisions opening up in the US followed by the storming of the Capitol. Socially the US is still very much on a knife edge. Meanwhile the Biden administration intends ramping up pressure on China over trade, human rights, and the situation in Hong Kong and Taiwan, rather than back off as was commonly expected.
Meanwhile on the Chinese mainland, the rot and the potential damage inflicted by any form of social unrest or civilian protests will most likely go far deeper, particularly since dynastic putrefaction and decline, after years of unfolding public scandals, and the recent antitrust push from China's Central Bank against the likes of Alibaba, have become common gossip on the street. If leaders lose their control over the prevailing memes in society, anything becomes possible.
Since taking over the leadership of the Party in November 2012 President Xi Jinping has repeatedly warned that corruption and decay have become so corrosive that they now threaten the Party and the state. He has criticized China's bureaucracy, hoping to curb the previously ubiquitous extravagance. Yet even today, claims are circulating about the fortunes that have already been amassed by members of Xi’s own family.
In 2013 such a story dominated the front pages. Bo Xilai, the former popular mayor of Dalian and one of the Party’s most favoured princelings, fell spectacularly from grace. The disclosures surrounding Bo’s inner circle, where mass torture was condoned and multimillion dollar favours were meted out as a matter of course, revealed a culture of ruthless fraud and duplicity few had imagined.
The case opened a Pandora’s box, effectively blowing the lid on the families of other leading Maoist revolutionaries and Politburo members (including that of the venerable Wen Jiabao) who, it is alleged, have used their status and abuse of official power to grow vast business empires and amass personal fortunes.
At this stage the long-term political fallout is hard to estimate. Bo himself was found guilty of corruption, stripped of all his assets and sentenced to life imprisonment. His downfall elicited strong reactions among the Chinese public and with commentators across the political spectrum. But as wealth becomes more and more concentrated in a small elite, the potential threat is amplified by the rise of a large, increasingly vocal internet community, that have no problems finding inventive ways to get around the firewalls of the state censors.
Many people conveniently forget that Chairman Mao Zedong had declared the only way to break free from the dynastic cycles that characterized Chinese history until then was through 'democratic' reform. That was in 1945. What Mao did not count on was how the children of the so-called Eight Immortals, the founders of the communist revolution, could foul things up so spectacularly.
By exploiting the trust of the state and gaining unlimited access to high-level political connections, the princelings are reaping vast rewards from China’s explosive growth. In an outcome that would shock Deng Xiaoping, the divide between the rich and the poor once again echos the pre-Communist era, further delaying badly needed reforms to curb state control that is often used merely to mask underlying inefficiencies.
Massive change to the political underpinnings of China could be in the offing as a result of these scandals, although the trigger could equally be economic or militaristic.
No rapidly-industrializing economies have been able to avert a financial crash at some stage in their history. I would not expect China to be an exception, in spite of its sheer pragmatism. The cause could be any of a number of factors. Yet the one element the Chinese leadership is most loath to confront is the sight of Party officials becoming modern-day Rockefellers at the expense of the people. Deng once proclaimed that 'to become wealthy is glorious' although I suspect it unlikely he was giving his blessing to current corrupt practices that have the potential to subvert the entire socialist order.
It would never have occurred to Deng that generating wealth could cause a rift in the social fabric of the nation sufficient to be China’s undoing. But when you follow the money trail it’s hard not to see that as a distinct possibility.
Meanwhile the more likely scenario for modern China is a continued escalation of economic and military power to rival that of past empires - including the US.